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Abstract. Rebound effects measure the behaviorally induced offset in the reduction of
energy consumption following efficiency improvements. Using both panel estimation
and quantile-regression methods on household travel diary data collected in Germa-
ny between 1997 and 2009, this study investigates the heterogeneity of the rebound
effect in private transport. With the average rebound effect being in the range of 57%
to 62%, our results are in line with a recent German study by FRONDEL, PETERS, and
VANCE (2008), but are substantially larger than those obtained from other studies. Fur-
thermore, our quantile-regression results indicate that the magnitude of estimated fuel
price elasticities – from which rebound effects can be derived – depends inversely on
the household’s driving intensity: Households with low vehicle mileage exhibit fuel
price elasticities, and hence rebound effects, that are significantly larger than those for
households with high vehicle mileage.
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1 Introduction
To maintain climate protection policy on track, the European Commission enacted new
legislation in 2009 under the auspices of Regulation No. 443/2009, which sets limits
on the allowable per-kilometer CO2 emissions of newly registered automobiles. This
regulation includes legally codified targets for the maximum CO2 discharges per kilo-
meter that increase with the mass of vehicles. As non-compliance with the allowable
emissions will result in heavy fines starting in 2012, the Commission expects that this
measure will induce considerable incentives for the development of fuel-saving tech-
nologies (FRONDEL, SCHMIDT, and VANCE 2010).
Irrespective of the directive’s effectiveness in increasing the fuel efficiency of au-
tomobiles, a critical issue in gauging its merits concerns how consumers adjust to al-
tered unit costs of car travel. While higher fuel prices, as implied by soaring oil prices
or increased taxes, raise these costs, improved efficiency effectively reduces them, the-
reby stimulating the demand for car travel. Such demand increases are referred to as
the rebound effect, as it offsets the reduction in energy demand that results from an
increase in efficiency.
Though the basic mechanism underlying the rebound effect is widely accepted,
its magnitude remains a contentious question (e. g. BROOKES 2000, BINSWANGER 2001,
SORRELL and DIMITROUPOULOS 2008). A survey by GRAHAM and GLAISTER (2004),
for example, cites mean fuel demand elasticities – from which rebound effects can be
derived – varying between -0.25 in the short-run and -0.77 in the long-run. More recent
work by WEST (2004) and FRONDEL, PETERS, and VANCE (2008), who use household-
level pooled and panel data from the U.S. and Germany, puts the estimated rebound
effect at the high end of this range, averaging between 87% and 57%, respectively.
In a subsequent article, FRONDEL and VANCE (2010a) employ person-, rather than
household-level data to investigate individual mobility behavior, finding fuel price ela-
sticity estimates ranging between -0.45 and -0.50. At the other end, HUGHES, KNITTEL,
and SPERLING (2008:113) uncover short-run fuel price elasticities varying between -
0.034 and -0.077 for the time period 2001-2006, using aggregate time series data from
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the U. S.
Aside from differences in the level of data aggregation, with the vast majority of
gasoline demand studies being based on aggregate level data at the country or sub-
national level (GRAHAM, GLAISTER, 2002:10), and in the estimation methods employ-
ed, one major reason for the diverging results of the empirical studies is that there is no
unanimous definition of the direct rebound effect. Instead, several definitions have be-
en employed in the economic literature as determined by the availability of price and
efficiency data (SORRELL and DIMITROUPOULOS 2008). For this reason, FRONDEL, PE-
TERS, and VANCE (2008) estimate the rebound effect using three common definitions,
and find robust results across both definitions and panel estimation methods.
The present study advances this line of inquiry by drawing on travel-diary da-
ta collected in Germany between 1997 and 2009 to investigate the heterogeneity of
the rebound. Inspired by WADUD, GRAHAM, and NOLAND (2010), who use interacti-
on terms to examine heterogeneity in the fuel price elasticity of gasoline consumpti-
on with respect to household income and the existence of both multiple vehicles and
multiple earners within a household, we employ both panel estimation and quantile
regression methods to capture the heterogeneity in the rebound effect depending on
the households’ traveling intensity.
Using data from the German Mobility Panel, this study builds on the recent ana-
lysis of direct rebound effects by FRONDEL, PETERS, and VANCE (2008) in several re-
spects. First, the robustness and sensitivity of the results of the former study is checked
by employing four additional waves of data for the years 2006 to 2009. Second, ex-
panding on the single-car focus of FRONDEL, PETERS, and VANCE (2008), the data set
analyzed here includes multiple-vehicle households, thereby allowing us to explore
the sensitivity of the estimates to their inclusion. Third, we add a fourth definition of
the rebound effect relying on the fuel price elasticity of travel demand and argue that
the rebound should be preferably estimated on this basis. Finally, in addition to provi-
ding for average effects across all types of households, which serve as a reference point,
the estimates using quantile regression indicate that the magnitude of the estimated re-
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bound effect depends inversely on the household’s driving intensity: Households with
low vehicle mileage exhibit rebound effects that are significantly larger than those for
households with high vehicle mileage.
The following section provides for a discussion on the choice of either of the com-
mon definitions of the direct rebound effect for estimation purposes. Section 3 presents
a concise description of quantile-regression approaches, building the basis for the em-
pirical estimation. Section 4 describes the panel data base used in the estimation, fol-
lowed by the presentation and interpretation of the results in Section 5. The last section
summarizes and concludes.
2 A Variety of Rebound Definitions
Along the lines of SORRELL and DIMITROUPOULOS (2008), we now catalogue three
widely known definitions of the direct rebound effect that are based on elasticities with
respect to changes of either efficiencies, service-, or fuel prices. First, the most natural
definition of the direct rebound effect is based on the elasticity of the demand for a
particular energy service, such as conveyance, with respect to efficiency:
Definition 1: ηµ(s) :=
∂ ln s
∂ lnµ
, (1)
reflecting the relative change in service demand s due to a percentage increase in effi-
ciency µ (see e. g. BERKHOUT et al., 2000).1
1In line with the economic literature (e. g. BINSWANGER, 2001:121), energy efficiency is defined here
by
µ =
s
e
> 0,
where the efficiency parameter µ characterizes the technology with which a service demand s is satis-
fied and e denotes the energy input employed for a service such as mobility. For the specific example
of individual conveyance, parameter µ designates fuel efficiency, which can be measured in terms of
vehicle kilometers per liter of fuel input. The efficiency definition reflects the fact that the higher the
efficiency µ of a given technology, the less energy e = s/µ is required for the provision of a service. The
above efficiency definition assumes proportionality between service level and energy input regardless
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Second, instead of ηµ(s), empirical estimates of the rebound effect are frequently
based on the negative of the price elasticity of service demand, ηps(s) (e.g. BINSWAN-
GER, 2001). As is shown, e. g. , by FRONDEL, PETERS, and VANCE (2008:161), both
rebound definitions are equivalent if, first, fuel prices pe are exogenous and, second,
service demand s solely depends on the service price ps := pe/µ, which is proportional
to the fuel price pe for given efficiency µ:
Definition 2: ηµ(s) = −ηps(s) . (2)
That the rebound may be captured by −ηps(s) reflects the fact that the direct rebound
effect is, in essence, a price effect, which works through shrinking service prices ps.
Third, empirical estimates of the rebound effect are sometimes necessarily ba-
sed on the negative own-price elasticity of fuel consumption, −ηpe(e), rather than on
−ηps(s), because data on fuel consumption and fuel prices is more commonly available
than on service demand and service prices.
Definition 3: ηµ(s) = −ηpe(e) . (3)
Definitions 2 and 3, however, are only equivalent if the energy efficiency µ is exogenous
(FRONDEL, PETERS, and VANCE, 2008:161). That is, the rebound definition given by
−ηpe(e) is equivalent to that given by ηµ(s) only if three preconditions hold true: (1)
fuel prices pe are exogenous, (2) service demand s solely depends on the service price
ps, and (3) efficiency µ is exogenous.
To analyze the heterogeneity of the rebound effect across households exhibiting
a variety of socioeconomic characteristics, we focus here on a fourth definition that
is given by the negative of the fuel price elasticity ηpe(s) of the demand for transport
services s. This focus is warranted for several reasons. First, while the most natural
definition of the direct rebound effect is based on the elasticity of transport demand
to efficiency µ, this definition is frequently not applicable, because in many empirical
studies efficiency data is not available or the data provides only limited variation in
efficiencies (SORRELL, DIMITROUPOULOS, SOMMERVILLE, 2009:1359).
of the level – a simplifying assumption that may not be true in general, but provides for a convenient
first-order approximation of the relationship of s with respect to e.
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Even more disconcerting is that observed efficiency increases may be endoge-
nous, rather than reflecting autonomous efficiency improvements. This is the case, for
instance, if a more efficient car is purchased in response to a job change that results in a
longer commute. Hence, due to the likely endogeneity of fuel efficiency (see e. g. SOR-
RELL, DIMITROUPOULOS, SOMMERVILLE, 2009:1361), it would be wise to refrain from
including this variable in any model specification aiming at estimating the response
to fuel price effects, as fuel efficiency may be a bad control (ANGRIST and PISCHKE,
2009:63).2 Rather than excluding µ from the analysis, alternative approaches are instru-
ment variable (IV) estimations or simultaneous equation systems that explain vehicle
miles traveled, fuel efficiency, and vehicle numbers at once. As we have no instrument
at hand, we are unable to employ IV methods to cope with the endogeneity of µ, nor
are we able to estimate simultaneous equation systems due to data unavailability.
Another problem emerging from the likely endogeneity of the efficiency µ is that
it contaminates the rebound definition based on the negative of the service demand
elasticity ηps(s) with respect to service price ps, which is given by ps = pe/µ. This high-
lights a handicap of Definition 2, namely that service prices represent a conglomerate
of efficiency and fuel prices, while more meaningful estimates of the rebound are based
on estimations where fuel-price and efficiency effects are strictly separated.
The rebound definition that is based on the own-price elasticity of fuel consump-
tion, ηpe(e), is the most restrictive of these three definitions, as it requires the validity
of three preconditions, rather than merely two of them, as is the case with rebound
definition −ηps(s). Furthermore, in contrast to transport service demand s, the depen-
dent variable e underlying definition −ηpe(e) explicitly depends on efficiency µ. For
example, fuel consumption e would ceteris paribus reduce to half if efficiency µ were to
2Equally important with respect to fuel price responses is to note that if technical fuel efficiency were
to be included in the estimation specification, the analysis is conditional on being locked to the same
vehicle, thereby holding technical efficiency constant. This implies that only one scenario of responses
to fuel prices is all that is allowed, that of driving the same car, whereas driving behavior will change for
numerous reasons in case of fuel price increases, most importantly due to the purchase of a new, more
efficient car.
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be doubled. This example illustrates that the likely endogenous variable µ needs to be
included in any model specification for estimating ηpe(e), thereby potentially biasing
the empirical results.
For these reasons, we focus here on a fourth rebound definition that is based on
the negative of the fuel price elasticity of transport demand, ηpe(s):
Definition 4: ηµ(s) = −ηpe(s) . (4)
It is now shown that −ηpe(s) is equivalent to ηµ(s) under the same assumptions as the
rebound definition given by −ηpe(e).
Proposition: If service demand s solely depends on ps, fuel prices pe are exogenous,
and energy efficiency µ is exogenous, then
ηpe(s) = ηps(s). (5)
Proof: Using price relation ps = pe/µ, the chain rule, and the assumption that the ser-
vice amount s solely depends on the price ps, we obtain
ηpe(s) =
∂ ln s
∂ ln pe
=
∂ ln s
∂ ln ps
· ∂ ln ps
∂ ln pe
= ηps(s) ·
∂ ln(pe/µ)
∂ ln pe
= ηps(s) · [
∂ ln pe
∂ ln pe
− ∂ lnµ
∂ ln pe
] = ηps(s) · [1−
∂ lnµ
∂ ln pe
] = ηps(s),
where the last term in the most right bracket vanishes if efficiency µ is exogenous, i. e. ,
if ∂ lnµ
∂ ln pe
= 0.
In sum, although theory would suggest estimating the efficiency elasticity ηµ(s)
to capture the rebound, the most promising empirical, but indirect way to elicit the
rebound effect is based on the estimation of fuel price elasticities, as fuel prices typi-
cally exhibit sufficient variation and, in contrast to fuel efficiency, can be regarded as
parameters that are largely exogenous to individual households. Among these fuel pri-
ce elasticities, the discussion provided in this section suggests selecting the fuel price
elasticity of transport demand, ηpe(s), for estimating the rebound effect.
Finally, it bears emphasizing that, apart from Definition 1, all these definitions
are based on the assumption that service demand is only a function of service price ps,
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as is the conventional assumption in the literature. In other words, the possibility that
efficiency improvements may not only increase service demand, but also determine
other factors, such as the time usage required by an energy service, the use of other
commodities, or capital cost, is not considered. In practice, however, more energy ef-
ficient appliances frequently have higher fixed costs while simultaneously reducing
operating costs through lower fuel and time requirements.
3 Methodology
In line with our focus, we estimate the following model specification, where the logged
monthly vehicle-kilometers traveled, ln(s), is regressed on logged fuel prices, ln(pe),
and a vector of control variables x described in detail in the subsequent section:
ln(sit) = α0 + αpe · ln(peit) + αTx · xit + ξi + νit . (6)
Subscripts i and t are used to denote the observation and time period, respectively.
ξi denotes an unknown individual-specific term, and νit is a random component that
varies over individuals and time. On the basis of this specification, Definition 4 tells
us that the rebound effect is obtained by the negative estimate of the coefficient αpe on
the logged fuel price. For the sake of comparison, Section 5 also presents the results of
those specifications that pertain to the Definitions 1-3, differing from (6) in either the
dependent variable (Definition 3) or the inclusion of efficiency µ (Definition 1), or the
inclusion of service price ps (Definition 2), rather than the fuel price pe.
To provide a reference point for the results obtained from the quantile-regression
approach, we estimate specification (6) using panel estimation methods (see e. g. FRON-
DEL and VANCE, 2010b, for a discussion). While the fixed-effects estimator may be a
potential alternative, we choose to employ random-effects methods, as the fixed-effects
estimator fails to efficiently estimate the coefficients of time-persistent variables, i. e. ,
variables that do not vary much within a household over time (WADUD, GRAHAM, and
NOLAND, 2010:55). Furthermore, the random-effects estimator is particularly attracti-
ve when the cross-section information, here determined by the number of households,
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is much larger than the number of time-series observations (HSIAO, 2003), as is the
case for our database. Not least, random-effects methods also allow for the estimati-
on of coefficients of time-invariant variables, which is precluded by the fixed-effects
estimator.
One potentially restrictive feature of both OLS and panel estimation methods is
that they focus on the conditional expectation function (CEF),
E(ln(sit|pe,xit)) = α0 + αpe · ln(peit) + αTx · xit , (7)
thereby yielding a uniform rebound effect given by the negative of the coefficient αpe .
Quantile-regression approaches, by contrast, aim at providing a more complete pic-
ture of the relationship between the dependent variable and the regressors at different
points in the conditional distribution of the dependent variable, which allows for more
flexibility in the estimation of rebound effects:
Qτ (ln(sit|pe,xit)) = α(τ) + αpe(τ) · ln(peit) + αTx (τ) · xit + F−1εit (τ) , (8)
where τ may take on values between zero and unity, Qτ (.|.) denotes the conditional
quantile function (CQF), F−1εit (.) is the inverse of the distribution function of εit, and
αpe(τ) indicates the variability in the households’ responses to fuel price changes, de-
pending upon the level of distance traveled. In short, the most attractive feature of
quantile-regression methods is that they generally provide for a richer characterizati-
on of the data, as these methods allow us to study the impact of a regressor such as
fuel prices on the full distribution of the dependent variable or any particular percen-
tile, not just the conditional mean.
For τ = 0.5, for instance, Q0.5(ln(s|pe,x) designates the median of the logged di-
stance traveled conditional on fuel prices pe and covariates x. In this special case of
a median regression, estimates of the parameters of quantile-regression model (8) re-
sult from the minimization of the sum of the absolute deviations, |Q0.5 − Qˆ0.5|. This
is perfectly in line with the well-known statistical result that it is the median that mi-
nimizes the sum of the absolute deviations of a variable, whereas it is the mean that
minimizes the sum of squared residuals, being a special case of OLS estimation. It is
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also well-known that the median is more robust to outliers than the mean. This pro-
perty translates to both median and quantile regressions in general, which have the
advantage that they are more robust to outliers than mean (OLS) regression methods.
In fact, OLS regressions can be inefficient when the dependent variable has a highly
non-normal distribution.3
More generally, for arbitrary τ ∈ (0, 1), the parameter estimates are obtained by
solving the following weighted minimization problem:
min
α(τ), αpe (τ), α
T
x (τ)
∑
ri>0
τ · ri +
∑
ri<0
(1− τ) · ri, (9)
where underpredictions ri := Qτ (yi|xi) − Qˆτ (yi|xi) > 0 are penalized by τ and over-
predictions ri < 0 by 1− τ . This is reasonable, as for large τ one would not expect low
estimates Qˆτ and vice versa, so that these incidences have to be penalized accordingly.
Just as OLS fits a linear function to the dependent variable by minimizing the expected
squared error, quantile regression fits a linear model using the generally asymmetric
loss function ρτ (r) := 1(r > 0) · τ · |r| + 1(r ≤ 0) · (1 − τ) · |r|), where r := Qτ − Qˆτ
and the indicator function 1(r > 0) indicates positive residuals r and 1(r ≤ 0) non-
positive residuals, respectively. Loss function ρτ (r) is also called a “check function”,
as its graph looks like a check-mark. Minimization problem (9) is set up as a line-
ar programming problem and can thus be solved by linear programming techniques
(KOENKER 2005). Variances can be estimated using a method suggested by KOENKER
and BASSETT (1982), but bootstrap methods are often preferred.
Conditional on pe and x, the CQFs given by (8) depend on the distribution of εit
via F−1εit (τ). In the special case that errors are independent and identically distributed,
that is, if F−1εit (τ) = F
−1
ε (τ) and, hence, the inverse distribution function does not vary
across observations, the CQFs exhibit common slopes, αpe(τ) = αpe and αx(τ) = αx,
3Further, rather theoretical advantages of quantile regression methods are, first, that, unlike OLS,
quantile-regression estimators do not require the existence of the conditional expected value for consis-
tency. Second, quantile regression is equivariant to monotone transformations. That is, the quantiles of
any monotone transformation h(y) of y equal the transformed quantiles of y: Qτ (h(y)) = h(Qτ (y)). This
property generally does not hold for the mean: E(h(y)) 6= h(E(y)).
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differing only in the intercepts: α(τ)+F−1ε (τ). In this case, there is no need for quantile
regression methods if the focus is on marginal effects, as these are given by the invari-
ant slope parameters. In general, however, the CQFs Qτ will differ at different values τ
in more than just the intercept and may well be even non-linear in x. This may be the
case if, for example, errors are heteroscedastic, which will be tested for our empirical
example presented in Section 5.
4 Data
The data used in this research is drawn from the German Mobility Panel (MOP 2010),
an ongoing travel survey that was initiated in 1994. The panel is organized in over-
lapping waves, each comprising a group of households surveyed for a period of six
weeks in the spring for three consecutive years. All households that participate in the
survey are requested to fill out a questionnaire eliciting general household informati-
on, person-related characteristics, and relevant aspects of everyday travel behavior. In
addition, respondents record the price paid for fuel, the liters of fuel consumed, and
the kilometers driven with each visit to a gas station and for every car in the household.
The data used in this paper cover thirteen years, spanning 1997 through 2009, a
period during which real fuel prices rose 1.97% per annum on average. The resulting
sample includes 2,165 households, 962 of which appear one year in the data, 474 of
which appear two years and 729 of which appear three consecutive years. Altogether,
we are faced with 4,097 observations. We use the travel survey information, which
is recorded at the level of the automobile, to derive the dependent and explanatory
variables required for estimating each of the four variants of the rebound effect. The
two dependent variables, which are converted into monthly figures to adjust for minor
variations in the survey duration, are the total monthly distance driven in kilometers
(Definitions 1, 2 and 4) and the total monthly liters of fuel consumed (Definition 3).
The three explanatory variables for identifying the direct rebound effect are the kilo-
meters traveled per liter (Definition 1), the price paid for fuel per kilometer traveled
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(Definition 2), and the price paid for fuel per liter (Definitions 3 and 4).4
The suite of control variables selected for inclusion in the model measure the
socio-economic attributes that are hypothesized to influence the extent of motorized
travel. These capture the demographic composition of the household, its income, the
surrounding population density, and dummies indicating the availability of multiple
cars, whether the household undertook a vacation with the car during the survey pe-
riod, and whether any employed member of the household changed jobs in the prece-
ding year. Table 1 contains the definitions and descriptive statistics of all the variables
used in the modeling.
Table 1: Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics
Variable Name Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev.
s Monthly kilometers driven 1,546.32 1,145.93
e Monthly fuel consumption in liters 94.01 62.86
µ Kilometers driven per liter 12.97 2.99
ps Real fuel price in Euros per kilometer 0.08 0.02
pe Real fuel price in Euros per liter 1.01 0.15
# driving licences Number of driving licences in a household 1.76 0.75
# employed Number of employed household members 1.03 0.86
vacation with car Dummy: 1 if household undertook 0.20 0.40
vacation with car during the survey period
children Dummy: 1 if children younger 0.33 0.47
than 19 live in household
job change Dummy: 1 if an employed household member
changed jobs within the preceding year 0.13 0.33
multi-car households Dummy: 1 if an household has more than one car 0.35 0.48
population density People per square km in the county in which the 835.97 1004.40
household is situated
4The price series was deflated using a consumer price index for Germany obtained from DESTATIS
(2010).
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5 Empirical Results
To provide for a reference point for the results obtained from a quantile-regression,
we first report in Table 2 the random-effects estimates of the model specifications cor-
responding to the four rebound definitions presented in Section 2. In line with our
reasoning in Section 3, we refrain from reporting the fixed-effects estimates, which are
largely similar to the estimated random effects for the fuel prices, but are statistically
insignificant for almost all other variables included; this is clearly the result of very low
variability of time-persistent variables, such as the presence of children or the number
of licensed drivers.
Moreover, we perform the classical BREUSCH-PAGAN (1979) test to examine the
superiority of the random-effects model over an OLS estimation using pooled data.
The test statistic of χ2(1) = 45.1 clearly rejects the null hypothesis of no heterogeneity
among households, which is also confirmed by the test statistics that result if the nor-
mality assumption underlying the BREUSCH-PAGAN test is dropped. According to the
discussion of Section 3, these test results also indicate that quantile regression methods
may provide for insights that go beyond those given by both the OLS and random-
effects estimates.
Several features of the results in Table 2 bear highlighting. First, while we prefer
the model specification related to Definition 4 for reasons presented in Section 2, its
estimated rebound effect of 57% is similar to that of Definitions 1 and 2, suggesting
that some 57% of the potential energy savings due to an efficiency improvement is lost
to increased driving. Particularly small is the difference in the estimated coefficient of
ln(pe) for the model specifications pertaining to Definition 1 and 4, which solely differ
in the inclusion of the likely endogenous variable efficiency. Also of note is that the
estimates are slightly lower than the range of 58% to 59 % estimated by FRONDEL,
PETERS, and VANCE (2008) for the sub-sample of single-vehicle German households
observed between 1997 and 2005.
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Table 2: Random-Effects Estimates5 for the Rebound based on Definitions 1 to 4.
Definition 1 Definition 2 Definition 3 Definition 4
Dependent variable ln(s) ln(s) ln(e) ln(s)
Coeff.s Std. Errors Coeff.s Std. Errors Coeff.s Std. Errors Coeff.s Std. Errors
ln(pe) ∗∗-0.555 (0.062) – – ∗∗-0.903 (0.067) ∗∗-0.574 (0.063)
ln(ps) – – ∗∗-0.459 (0.040) – – – –
ln(µ) ∗∗0.418 (0.051) – – ∗∗-0.529 (0.057) – –
children ∗∗0.077 (0.027) ∗∗ 0.080 (0.027) ∗∗ 0.084 (0.028) ∗0.065 (0.027)
logged income ∗∗0.094 (0.032) ∗∗ 0.101 (0.032) ∗0.082 (0.034) ∗0.077 (0.032)
# driving licenses ∗∗0.084 (0.019) ∗∗ 0.085 (0.019) ∗0.035 (0.017) ∗∗ 0.079 (0.019)
# employed ∗∗0.125 (0.016) ∗∗ 0.125 (0.016) ∗∗ 0.108 (0.016) ∗∗ 0.128 (0.016)
job change 0.044 (0.028) 0.044 (0.028) 0.050 (0.030) 0.051 (0.029)
vacation with car ∗∗0.248 (0.020) ∗∗ 0.249 (0.020) ∗∗ 0.340 (0.021) ∗∗0.252 (0.020)
population density ∗∗-0.068 (0.013) ∗∗-0.068 (0.013) ∗∗-0.055 (0.013) ∗∗-0.073 (0.013)
multi-car households ∗∗0.444 (0.028) ∗∗ 0.444 (0.028) ∗∗-0.091 (0.028) ∗∗ 0.456 (0.028)
constants ∗∗6.782 (0.246) ∗∗ 6.819 (0.245) ∗∗ 2.423 (0.259) ∗∗ 6.059 (0.235)
Observations used 4,097 4,097 4,097 4,097
Note: ∗ denotes significance at the 5 %-level and ∗∗ at the 1 %-level, respectively.
Second, with a magnitude of about -0.9, the elasticity estimate of fuel consumpti-
on with respect to fuel price changes, and hence rebound Definition 3, is much larger
than the respective elasticity estimates of kilometers traveled. This estimate replica-
tes a result commonly found in the literature: that the fuel price has a much stronger
influence on fuel consumption than on the number of kilometers driven (GRAHAM,
GLAISTER, 2004:272).
Third, from estimating the specification associated with Definition 1, it follows
that the impact of efficiency improvements on traveled distance is of the same order as
5To correct for the non-independence of repeated observations from the same households over the
years of the survey, observations are clustered at the level of the household, and the presented standard
errors are robust to this survey design feature.
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the effect of lowered fuel prices. In fact, with a test statistic of χ2(1) = 2.77, we cannot
reject the null hypothesisH0 : αµ = −αpe for a significance level of 5%. The assumption
underlying H0 is intuitive and frequently invoked in the literature, but rarely tested
(SORRELL, DIMITROUPOULOS, SOMMERVILLE, 2009:1360): for constant fuel prices pe,
raising efficiency µ should have the same effect on the service price ps, and hence on
the distance traveled, as falling fuel prices pe given a constant efficiency µ. Hence, there
is no reason, neither on a theoretical nor an empirical basis, to assume that Definitions
1 and 2 yield divergent results for the rebound effect.
Ultimately, while Definition 1 would suggest a rebound effect of 42%, from a stati-
stical point of view provided by testing H0, it is equally warranted to take the negative
of the fuel price elasticity estimate, i. e. 0.56, as an estimate of the rebound effect, in-
dicating that the rebound estimates are of a similar magnitude across all definitions
except for Definition 3. As the comparison of the estimates from Definitions 1 and 4
reveals, omitting the likely endogenous variable µ has hardly any effect on the estima-
tion results, particularly on the fuel price coefficient estimates. The empirical reason for
this outcome is that efficiency µ and contemporaneous real fuel prices pe are virtually
uncorrelated, with a correlation coefficient of -0.015.
To further analyze the robustness of our results and accommodate potential sources
of heterogeneity in the estimated fuel price elasticities and rebound effects, several ad-
ditional models were explored. We began by estimating the same specifications, but
limiting the sample to single-car households. The estimation results reported in Table
3 in the Appendix indicate that the travel demand responsiveness of single-car hou-
seholds to fuel prices is somewhat more pronounced than is obtained when multi-car
households are included. This may be explained by the fact that in multi-car house-
holds household members are able to choose among the most efficient cars for their
traveling purposes. This explanation is consistent with our finding that the fuel con-
sumption responsiveness to fuel prices is somewhat reduced, from -0.9 to -0.8, when
the sample is limited to single-car households.
There are additional discrepancies emerging from the single-car sample: Whi-
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le the presence of children, for example, positively affects both travel demand and
fuel consumption for the whole sample, this variable does not play a significant role
in determining the travel behavior of single-car households. This may be due to the
fact that single-car households prioritize car use for commuting, requiring children to
use public transport systems more frequently. Conversely, the dummy variable indica-
ting a job change in the previous year has a statistically significant effect only for the
single-car households, which substantiates the logic that such households use the car
primarily for commuting purposes.
Table 3: Random-Effects Estimates for Single-Car Households.
Definition 1 Definition 2 Definition 3 Definition 4
dependent variable ln(s) ln(s) ln(e) ln(s)
Coeff.s Std. Errors Coeff.s Std. Errors Coeff.s Std. Errors Coeff.s Std. Errors
ln(pe) ∗∗-0.676 (0.079) – – ∗∗-0.810 (0.078) ∗∗-0.711 (0.082)
ln(ps) – – ∗∗-0.620 (0.050) – – – –
ln(µ) ∗∗0.594 (0.067) – – ∗∗-0.467 (0.072) – –
children 0.061 (0.037) 0.062 (0.037) 0.068 (0.036) 0.054 (0.038)
logged income 0.015 (0.035) 0.018 (0.034) 0.007 (0.034) -0.005 (0.035)
# driving licenses ∗∗0.073 (0.022) ∗∗ 0.074 (0.022) ∗∗ 0.060 (0.023) ∗∗ 0.062 (0.023)
# employed ∗∗0.142 (0.021) ∗∗ 0.142 (0.021) ∗∗ 0.137 (0.020) ∗∗ 0.143 (0.021)
job change ∗0.097 (0.040) ∗ 0.097 (0.040) ∗∗ 0.112 (0.039) ∗0.107 (0.042)
vacation with car ∗∗0.312 (0.024) ∗∗ 0.311 (0.024) ∗∗ 0.321 (0.025) ∗∗0.326 (0.026)
population density ∗∗-0.058 (0.015) ∗∗-0.057 (0.015) ∗∗-0.059 (0.015) ∗∗-0.063 (0.015)
constants ∗∗7.711 (0.265) ∗∗ 7.737 (0.262) ∗∗ 3.064 (0.271) ∗∗ 6.645 (0.258)
Observations used 2,646 2,647 2,646 2,660
Note: ∗ denotes significance at the 5 %-level and ∗∗ at the 1 %-level, respectively. Standard errors are calculated using
bootstrap methods.
Aside from exploring differences across single- and multi-car households, we fol-
lowed the lead of WADUD, GRAHAM, and NOLAND (2010) in investigating heteroge-
neity of fuel price elasticities and, hence, the rebound effect with respect to income, the
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existence of multiple cars within a household, and residence in rural or urban areas.
To this end, each of these variables was interacted with fuel prices to allow for diffe-
rential elasticities. After exploring several specifications that included the interactions
individually and jointly, we found no evidence for statistically significant effects on the
interaction terms.
Yet another source of heterogeneity may relate to driving-intensity itself: To the
extent that those who drive more are more dependent on car travel, we would expect
them to exhibit less responsiveness to changes in the cost of driving than those who
drive less. Drawing on Definition 4, this hypothesis can be tested by referencing the
results of a quantile regression, reported in Table 4.
Table 4: Quantile-Regression Results for the Specification related to Definition 4.
Q10(ln(s)) Q30(ln(s)) Q70(ln(s)) Q90(ln(s))
Coeff.s Std. Errors Coeff.s Std. Errors Coeff.s Std. Errors Coeff.s Std. Errors
ln(pe) ∗∗-0.898 (0.116) ∗∗-0.714 (0.076) ∗∗-0.551 (0.080) ∗∗-0.561 (0.088)
children ∗∗ 0.129 (0.045) ∗ 0.060 (0.029) -0.015 (0.032) -0.048 (0.033)
logged income 0.050 (0.068) ∗∗ 0.183 (0.042) ∗∗ 0.170 (0.045) 0.071 (0.049)
# driving licenses ∗∗0.197 (0.035) ∗∗ 0.103 (0.018) 0.024 (0.019) 0.032 (0.021)
# employed ∗∗0.208 (0.031) ∗∗ 0.160 (0.016) ∗∗ 0.149 (0.018) ∗∗ 0.129 (0.021)
job change -0.053 (0.055) ∗∗ 0.079 (0.035) ∗∗ 0.107 (0.031) ∗∗ 0.099 (0.042)
vacation with car ∗∗0.380 (0.044) ∗∗ 0.332 (0.026) ∗∗ 0.249 (0.027) ∗∗ 0.152 (0.030)
inhabitant density ∗∗-0.081 (0.015) ∗∗-0.078 (0.011) ∗∗-0.060 (0.015) ∗∗-0.043 (0.013)
multi-car households ∗∗0.377 (0.046) ∗∗ 0.465 (0.029) ∗∗ 0.478 (0.032) ∗∗ 0.539 (0.038)
constants ∗∗5.203 (0.478) ∗∗ 4.902 (0.307) ∗∗ 5.746 (0.330) ∗∗ 6.880 (0.358)
Observations used 4,097 4,097 4,097 4,097
Note: ∗ denotes significance at the 5 %-level and ∗∗ at the 1 %-level, respectively. Standard errors are calculated using bootstrap
methods. The panel structure of the data is not exploited, as panel quantile methods are fairly new and not implemented in Stata.
In fact, as Table 4 illustrates, there is some moderate heterogeneity in the rebound
depending on the households’ travel intensity. The fuel price elasticity of about -0.90
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in the lowest decile is 61% smaller than the estimate of -0.56 in the most upper decile,
confirming that the magnitude of the rebound is substantially larger for households
that drive less. In this example, an F-test statistic of F (1; 4, 087) = 6.51 confirms signi-
ficantly different coefficients at the 5% level. Moreover, as the F-Test results in Table
5 show, the estimated rebound at the 10%-quantile is significantly different from the
respective coefficient estimates of the deciles onwards 40%.
Table 5: F-Tests for Identical Decile Coefficients for the Rebound
Quantiles 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
10% – – – – – – – – –
20% 1.47 – – – – – – – –
30% 3.54 1.34 – – – – – – –
40% ∗ 4.01 1.78 0.37 – – – – – –
50% ∗∗ 6.66 ∗ 4.06 2.51 1.63 – – – – –
60% ∗∗ 8.58 ∗ 5.87 ∗ 4.22 3.21 1.22 – – – –
70% ∗∗ 8.18 ∗ 5.44 ∗ 4.03 3.04 1.12 0.13 – – –
80% ∗∗11.15 ∗∗ 8.00 ∗ 6.58 ∗ 5.12 3.26 1.60 1.26 – –
90% ∗ 6.51 3.73 2.27 1.42 0.42 0.01 0.02 0.93 –
Note: ∗ denotes significance at the 5 %-level and ∗∗ at the 1 %-level, respectively. The critical
values are F (1; 4, 097) = 3.84 and F (1; 4, 097) = 6.64, respectively.
Further insight into this pattern can be gleaned from Figure 1, which shows the
quantile estimates along with the estimate obtained from an OLS regression. While the
lower responsiveness of more car-reliant households to fuel prices changes is clearly
evident from the plot of quantile estimates, the degree of heterogeneity again appears
moderate. With some exceptions at the upper and lower ends, most of the point esti-
mates from the quantile regression fall within the 95% confidence interval of the OLS
estimate.
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Figure 1: OLS and Quantile Regression Results for the Rebound according to Definition
4.
6 Summary and Conclusion
Because increases in fuel efficiency effectively decrease the unit costs of driving, their
effectiveness in reducing emissions may be offset by increased demand for car travel.
Although the existence of this so-called rebound effect has been recognized for some
time (CRANDALL, 1992), there still remains much debate as to its magnitude. With the
European Union increasingly relying of efficiency standards as a climate protection
tool in the transport sector, this debate has taken on increased relevancy.
Drawing on household level data from Germany, the present study employs OLS,
panel, and quantile regression techniques to estimate the magnitude of the rebound
effect as well as explore the degree of its heterogeneity across households. Contrasting
with WADUD, GRAHAM, and NOLAND’s (2010) analysis of US-based data, we find
no evidence for differential rebound effects by income level, geographical location, or
the number of cars owned. Results from the quantile regression, however, do suggest
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some heterogeneity according to driving intensity, with the estimated rebound ranging
from a low of 50% in the 80%-quantile to a high of 90% in the 10%-quantile. Evidently,
reduced travel cost causes households with an already high demand for automotive
service to extend their demand to a lesser degree than households with low automotive
mobility.
From a policy perspective, the fact that the estimated rebound is relatively high
irrespective of driving intensity calls into question the effectiveness of efficiency stan-
dards as a pollution control instrument. The median regression rebound estimate amounts
to 62% (see Table A1), which is just slightly higher in magnitude than the mean estima-
te of 57% from the corresponding random-effects specification. Moreover, it is roughly
of the same order as that obtained by FRONDEL, PETERS, and VANCE (2008), who used
an abridged version of the current data set that extended to the year 2005. Since that
time, annually averaged fuel prices climbed another 9% to reach a peak in 2008, follo-
wed by a drop of 9% in the following year (ARAL 2009). These fluctuations appear to
have had no bearing on a key conclusion emerging from the data, namely that some
60% of the potential energy saving from efficiency improvements in Germany is lost to
increased driving.
On the basis of these findings, the European Commission’s expressed reserva-
tions with reliance on fuel excise taxes (COM 2007) coupled with a corresponding
emphasis on per-kilometer emissions reductions as a key instrument for reducing to-
tal emissions from transport should be met with skepticism. We would instead concur
with STERNER (2007) that fuel taxes should continue to play an important role in clima-
te policy. Unlike fuel efficiency standards, fuel taxes directly confront motorists with
the costs of driving, which not only encourages the purchase of more fuel efficient
vehicles, but also has an immediate impact on driving behavior.
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Appendix A
Table A1: OLS, Median Regression, and Random-Effects Results for Rebound based
on Definition 4.
OLS Median Regression Random Effects
Coeff.s Std. Errors Coeff.s Std. Errors Coeff.s Std. Errors
ln(pe) ∗∗-0.694 (0.073) ∗∗-0.618 (0.064) ∗∗-0.574 (0.063)
children 0.043 (0.030) 0.003 (0.028) ∗0.065 (0.027)
logged income ∗∗ 0.127 (0.039) ∗∗ 0.194 (0.048) ∗0.077 (0.032)
# driving licenses ∗∗ 0.082 (0.020) ∗∗ 0.052 (0.018) ∗∗ 0.079 (0.019)
# employed ∗∗ 0.161 (0.017) ∗∗ 0.162 (0.016) ∗∗ 0.128 (0.016)
job change ∗0.072 (0.032) ∗0.079 (0.038) 0.051 (0.029)
vacation with car ∗∗ 0.301 (0.023) ∗∗ 0.288 (0.027) ∗∗0.252 (0.020)
population density ∗∗-0.064 (0.013) ∗∗-0.068 (0.000) ∗∗-0.073 (0.013)
multi-car households ∗∗ 0.466 (0.029) ∗∗ 0.476 (0.026) ∗∗ 0.456 (0.028)
constants ∗∗ 5.625 (0.282) ∗∗ 5.212 (0.355) ∗∗ 6.059 (0.235)
Note: ∗ denotes significance at the 5 %-level and ∗∗ at the 1 %-level, respectively.
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